Order-Flow Auctions & MEV Redistribution — Final Exam

This is where the analogies stop and the accounting begins. No pretests, no warm-ups — just the course asking whether the four verbs, the refund math, the auctions, and the tradeoffs actually stuck. Everything you need, the previous six lessons already taught you. Read each option twice; the trap is almost always the one that is 90% right.

How this exam works

This is a graded exam. Questions arrive one at a time. Once you submit an answer it is final — there is no going back, no second try, and a wrong answer simply fails that question. Your score stays hidden until the very end, where you need 70% to pass. Read every option carefully before you commit.

Question 1 of 24

The course frames the MEV story with four verbs: minimize, capture, redistribute, democratize. Which verb best describes an order-flow auction that refunds back-run profits to the user who created the trade?

Minimize — the auction makes the extractable MEV shrink to zeroDemocratize — the auction decentralizes who is allowed to run the sequencerCapture — the auction lets the searcher capture and keep the full back-run valueRedistribute — the MEV is still extracted, but the proceeds are routed back to the user instead of kept by the searcher or builder

Select an answer to continue.

You made it through the gauntlet. If you cleared 70%, you can read an order-flow auction, an intent, a batch settlement, and a SUAVE-style design and say, in each case, exactly who is being paid and why — and spot the toll booth wearing a redistribution costume. Next up the ladder: the rest of the expert crypto track builds on this same instinct for following the money around a block.

Big picture

Order-flow auctions & MEV redistribution, end to end

MEV redistribution, end to end
- The redistribution turn
  - Four verbs: minimize / capture / redistribute / democratize
  - Order flow is an asset with real value
  - User created the trade → natural owner of the value
  - Redistribute changes WHO is paid, not whether MEV exists
- Order-flow auctions (OFAs)
  - Sells the right to back-run a user trade
  - Refund r·B to user, (1−r)·B to operator, V−B to searcher
  - Competition bids B up toward V
  - MEVBlocker refunds ~90% of back-run value
  - Refunds back-runs, but alone may not stop sandwiches
- Intents & solvers
  - Intent = declared outcome, not exact steps
  - Solvers/fillers compete on best execution
  - UniswapX Dutch auction: output starts high, decays
  - Cheapest profitable solver fills; competition → better fill
  - Gasless and MEV-protected for the user
- Batch auctions & CoW
  - Orders settled together in one batch
  - Uniform clearing price kills in-batch ordering MEV
  - Coincidence of wants matches opposite orders P2P
  - CoWs skip AMM fee, slippage, and MEV
  - Residual routed to AMMs; solvers compete on the batch
- MEV-Share & SUAVE
  - Programmable privacy via selective hints
  - Privacy–value tradeoff: reveal more → bigger refund, more exposure
  - Hiding size defends against sandwiches
  - SUAVE: decentralized neutral sequencing + encrypted mempool + MEVM
  - The "democratize" verb made concrete
- Mechanism-design tradeoffs
  - Competition can decay into solver centralization
  - Moat/flywheel: exclusive flow compounds a lead
  - Censorship & verifiability are open gaps
  - Redistribution changes who is paid, not that MEV exists
  - Scorecard: real redistribution vs a toll booth

Six lessons, one thesis: MEV is captured around user trades, and these mechanisms change who is paid — from the four verbs, through OFAs, intents, batches, and MEV-Share/SUAVE, to the tradeoffs that separate real redistribution from a toll booth.