This is the capstone — one graded run across the entire course. The questions roam over everything: why counterparty risk is two-sided and stochastic where a loan’s is one-sided and known, so exposure is max(value, 0) and a winning trade is the only one that can hurt you; how you measure that exposure with EE and EPE for pricing and PFE at a high quantile for limits, and why an interest-rate swap traces a hump while an FX forward rises monotonically to maturity; how close-out netting collapses a netting set to one number and how variation margin, segregated initial margin, thresholds, minimum transfer amounts, and haircuts shrink what is left; how CVA prices the counterparty’s default, DVA mirrors your own (with its paradoxical gain when your credit rots) and BCVA = CVA − DVA; how the whole XVA waterfall stacks risk-free value with CVA, DVA, FVA, MVA, KVA, and ColVA into an all-in price; how wrong-way risk makes exposure balloon exactly as the counterparty fails, the way AIG did in 2008; and how a central counterparty novates, multilaterally nets, and mutualises losses through a default waterfall, with SA-CCR setting EAD = 1.4 × (RC + PFE). There is no formula sheet and no second guess — read all the options before you commit, because each wrong one is a trap that has caught a real desk.
How this exam works
This is a graded exam. Questions arrive one at a time. Once you submit an answer it is final — there is no going back, no retries, and a wrong answer simply fails that question. Your score stays hidden until the very end, where you need 70% to pass. Slow down and read every option before you commit.
An uncollateralised interest-rate swap with your counterparty is currently marked at +$2m in your favour. The counterparty defaults today. Ignoring recovery, what is your exposure?
Select an answer to continue.
Course Recap
Whatever your score reads, the framework you just stress-tested — counterparty risk as bilateral, stochastic exposure equal to max(value, 0), where only the trades in your favour can hurt you; exposure measured with EE and EPE for pricing and PFE at a high quantile for limits, tracing a hump for swaps and a rising line for FX forwards; close-out netting that collapses a set to one number and variation margin, segregated initial margin, thresholds, minimum transfer amounts and haircuts that shrink what is left; CVA pricing the counterparty’s default at LGD × EPE × PD, DVA mirroring your own with its paradoxical gain, and BCVA = CVA − DVA; the XVA waterfall that stacks risk-free value with CVA, DVA, FVA, MVA and KVA into an all-in price; wrong-way risk that swells exposure exactly as the counterparty fails, the way AIG did; and central clearing that novates, multilaterally nets and mutualises losses through a default waterfall with SA-CCR’s EAD = 1.4 × (RC + PFE) — is the working map of how derivative counterparty risk is really measured, priced and managed. Here is the whole course in one glance.
Big picture
Counterparty Risk & XVA, in one glance
- Counterparty Risk & XVA
- What counterparty risk is
- Exposure = max(value, 0) — only winning trades can hurt
- Bilateral and stochastic, unlike a one-sided loan
- A +$2m swap risks $2m; a −$2m swap risks $0
- Recovery and LGD set the size of the loss
- Pre-settlement, over the whole life of the trade
- Measuring exposure
- EE = average exposure at each future date
- EPE = time-average of EE — feeds CVA pricing
- PFE = high quantile (~95%) — feeds limits
- Swap profile = a hump (diffusion vs amortisation)
- FX forward = monotone rising, peaks at maturity
- Netting & collateral
- Close-out netting: +5 −3 +2 → max = $4m, not $7m
- VM collateralises the current mark, daily
- IM covers the margin-period-of-risk gap, segregated
- Threshold, MTA, and haircut shape the CSA
- Both netting and collateral cut EPE and CVA
- CVA, DVA & the XVA family
- CVA ≈ LGD × EPE × PD — price of their default
- DVA mirrors your own default; the gain paradox
- BCVA = CVA − DVA
- FVA funds the mark, MVA funds IM, KVA = capital cost
- Waterfall: 100 − 0.80 + 0.50 − 0.40 − 0.30 − 0.50 = 98.50
- Wrong-way risk
- Exposure rises as the counterparty default prob rises
- General WWR = macro driver (EM FX stress)
- Specific WWR = correlated CDS seller / own-share collateral
- Right-way risk is the helpful opposite
- AIG 2008 = the textbook case
- Central clearing
- Novation: CCP becomes buyer to every seller
- Multilateral netting + loss mutualisation
- Waterfall: IM → DF contribution → SITG → fund → assessments
- SA-CCR: EAD = 1.4 × (RC + PFE) = $7m on RC 2, PFE 3
- Clearing kills CVA/DVA/FVA; MVA + smaller KVA remain
- What counterparty risk is
Key Takeaways
What you now own
You can take any derivative counterparty exposure apart. You know exposure is max(value, 0), so a winning trade is the only one that can hurt you, and that counterparty risk is bilateral and stochastic where a loan’s is one-sided and known. You can measure it with EE and EPE for pricing and PFE at a high quantile for limits, and you can sketch the swap’s hump against the FX forward’s rising line from memory. You can collapse a netting set to its close-out value, and explain how variation margin neutralises the current mark while segregated initial margin covers the margin-period-of-risk gap, with thresholds, MTAs and haircuts shaping the CSA. You can price the counterparty’s default with CVA ≈ LGD × EPE × PD, mirror it with DVA and its gain-on-your-own-decline paradox, net them into BCVA, and stack the whole XVA waterfall — CVA, DVA, FVA, MVA, KVA — into an all-in price. You can spot wrong-way risk in its general and specific flavours and name AIG as the case study. And you can describe how a CCP novates, multilaterally nets and mutualises losses through its default waterfall, with SA-CCR setting EAD = 1.4 × (RC + PFE) — so you can always answer the only question that matters: how much can this counterparty really cost me, who is collateralising what, and who pays first when it all goes wrong?